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The Appellant Summit County submits this Reply Brief.
RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action below involved an appeal of a decision by the
Summit County Board of Adjustment (the "Board") upholding the
Director of Community Development's (the "Director's") decision
to deny Appellee, Red Barn Development, L.C. ("Red Barn"), a
building permit because Red Barn had not procured a final site
plan approval from Summit County (the "County").
Red Barn is mistaken that the Snyderville Basin Development
Code (the "Code") "sets forth differing procedures [for obtaining
building permits] depending upon whether the development is a
permitted use or a conditional use within certain zones."
(Appellee's Brief, pp. 3 ) . Although it is true that some
development requirements may differ, depending upon the use, it
is not true that the procedure for obtaining a building permit
varies.

Sections 4.12, 5.17, and 6.14 of the Code and the

Snyderville Basin Administrative Guidelines (the "Guidelines"),
Sections 12.1 & 12.2 set forth the same procedures for obtaining
a building permit regardless of the type of use.
Additionally, Red Barn's insistence that the County, outside
of the site plan issue, "made no other objection to Red Barn's
Application" is misleading.

(Appellee's Brief, pp. 5 ) . In

truth, the County did not proceed with a review of the Red Barn
building permit application after it was discovered that no final
1

site plan had been obtained.

(R. 284; 320-21; 326-27) .

Consequently, no further objection was stated because no further
review had been conducted.
RESPONSE TO APPELLEES SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Red Barn asserts that "Summit County attempts to rewrite the
Development Code, through its tortured interpretation, so as to
impose requirements upon Red Barn which are not contained within
the plain language of the Development Code."

(Appellee's Brief,

pp. 6 ) . This simply is not true.
The County's argument is not twisted or distorted, nor even
tortured, but well reasoned and very practical.

In simple terms,

the County's argument is thus:

(1)

The Snyderville Basin Development Code is divided into

two areas:

zoning regulations, which define the uses and

densities of a property

(Chapter 3 ) , and permitting

regulations, which implement the zoning through development
permits

(Chapters 4 - 7 ) .

Chapter 1 is devoted to

administrative information and Chapter 2 are definitions.

(2)

Section 3.6(a)(1) of the Code discusses

uses" within the context of zoning.

"permitted

That Section clearly

states that a "permitted use" is implemented through a
"development permit."

All parties concede that Red Barn's

Timberwolf Lodge project is a "permitted use" within the
Resort Commercial Zone District.

(3)

Section 3.1(b)(8).

A "development permit" is defined in Section 2.2(43) to

include a "building permit," as well as a "final site plan."

(4)

Both the Snyderville Basin Development Code and Utah

state law require a "building permit" be issued prior to
starting construction of any development.
U.C.A. 17-27-1002(2)(b).

Section 4.12(a) &

Consequently, Red Barn must obtain

a "building permit" prior to commencing construction of its
project.

(5)

The requirements for all "development permits" are

found in Chapter 4 of the Code.

Consequently, it is no

great surprise that the requirements for a "building permit"
are principally found in Section 4.12(b).

A literal reading

of that section requires a plat and final site plan for all
development activity as a prerequisite for a "building
permit."

This standard is stricter than the County Land Use

Development and Management Act

(the "Act"), which requires

plats only on subdivisions of land.

U.C.A. 17-27-804.

However, the Act clearly states that the County may impose
stricter regulations if it so chooses.
3

U.C.A. 17-27-104(1).

(6)

The Snyderville Basin Administrative Guidelines

(the

"Guidelines"), which were enacted by the County Commission
at the same time as the original Code

(R. 2 8 9 ) , are meant to

help assist the County and applicants in the
and implementation of the Code."

"administration

Guidelines, Section 2.

Section 12.2.1 of the Guidelines, which discusses

"building

permit" requirements and is meant to assist in implementing
Section 4.12 of the Code, interprets Section 4.12(b) to mean
that either a "minor permit," "final subdivision plat" or
"final site plan" is required prior to issuance of a
"building permit."

(7)

This interpretation of Section 4.12(b), as requiring

that at least one of those aforementioned development
permits

(minor permit, final subdivision plat, or final site

plan) be approved prior to issuance of a "building permit,"
has been a consistent position within the County since the
Code's original adoption in January 1993.

(R. 307-08).

This position is also very fair to property owners in that
the County's interpretation of the Code has been done in the
least restrictive fashion.

See Patterson v. Utah County

Board of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 606

(Utah App. 1995).

The more restrictive alternative interpretation would be to
ignore Section 12.2.1 of the Guidelines and require all
4

projects, to include Red Barn, to submit both a site plan
and plat for approval.1

As can easily be seen by this

forthright analysis, Red Barn's position that Section
4.12(b) should be ignored with regard to "permitted uses"
is unreasonable, violative of the plain language of the Code
section, and inconsistent with the rules of statutory
construction noted on pages 29-31 of the Brief of the
Appellant Summit County.

(8)

In sum, the only question remaining in this logical

sequence is to determine which one of the three prerequisite
permits applies to Red Barn.

The County has always asserted

that the one which applies to Red Barn is a matter of common
sense, logic, and plain statutory language.
(a)

Red Barn admits that its project is neither a

subdivision, which requires a plat under State law and
Section 4.7 of the Code (R. 289), nor a "lot of record"
which would require a Minor Permit under Sections
2.2(65) Sc (69) of the Code and Chapter 15 of the
Guidelines.

(Appellee's Brief, pp. 15, footnote #3).

1

It is interesting to note that when Red Barn attacks the
language of Section 12.2.1 of the Guidelines, it consistently
fails to mention that the County's reading of such in conjunction
with Section 4.12(b) is in Red Barn's favor.
5

(b)

Consequently, that leaves the Red Barn project

subject to a final site plan.

(9)

This is only logical, as site plans are typically used

to evaluate commercial and multi-family projects, such as
the Timberwolf Lodge project proposed by Red Barn.

See

Mandelker, Land Use Law 4th ed., Section 6.68, pp. 279-80
(1997) .

(10)

This logical sequence is also confirmed by Section

6.14(a) (1) wherein the Code expressly requires a "final site
plan" for Red Barn's commercial/multi-family use project.
Even the Appellee's own architect has admitted that we
should not be splitting hairs about whether a "site plan
need[s] to be done, because clearly, they get done and they
get approved and they have all of the information that we
would have otherwise."

(R. 2 8 7 ) . 2

This admission was

relied upon by the Board in their findings.

2

(R. 316).

The architect's argument with the County has been over
who does the review, the County's planning staff or the planning
commission. In his view point, it should be the staff. (R.
287). However, Section 4.6 requires action by both the planning
and county commissions.
6

As one can see, the County's argument is a logical progression
through the Code.3

It is well reasoned and consistent with how

projects, such as Red Barn's, are evaluated by many
jurisdictions.

To deny the County its ability to evaluate this

project through site plan review is to negate the County
Commission's legislative intent to implement zoning through a
detailed permitting system which allows for public input and a
recommendation from its planning commission.
ARGUMENT
I.

DECISIONS OF A BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT ARE ACCORDED SUBSTANTIAL
DEFERENCE•
Red Barn correctly agrees with Summit County that "when

reviewing the decision of a board of adjustment, a trial court
may determine 'only whether or not the decision is arbitrary,
capricious, or illegal.'"

(Appellee's Brief, pp. 7 ) . Red Barn

goes on to assert that the interpretation of the Code in the
present case by the Board constituted illegal action and thus the
Board's decision is subject to "de novo" review.

(Appellee's

Brief, pp. 7-8).
Red Barn mentions in brief its perception that the County
has attempted to rewrite its Code through a tortured
interpretation.

(Appellee's Brief, pp. 6 ) . However, to

3

For a detailed discussion of the County's reasoning, see
Brief of the Appellant Summit County, pp. 32-41.
7

interpret the Utah State Legislature's intent behind the
statutory standard of review as (1) defining any disagreement by
a party with a board of adjustment's interpretation of its own
code as illegal, and (2) requiring "de novo" review in all such
cases, is truly tortured and could never have been the
legislative intent.

As noted on pages 19-21 of the Brief of the

Appellant Summit County, no "de novo" review is allowed by
statute.

Where the board's decision is supported by substantial

evidence, it is affirmed.

U.C.A. 17-27-708(6).

As Judge Bench

of the Utah Court of Appeals has stated:
When interpreting regulations such as a zoning
ordinance, "a reasonable administrative interpretation
and practice should be given some weight." Salt Lake
City v. Salt Lake County, 568 P.2d 738, 741-42 (Utah
1977). Given the technical expertise of the County's
zoning and planning department, it is in a much better
position than we are to achieve the desired goal of
proper zoning as determined by the County Commission.
We therefore must defer to its administrative
interpretation of its own zoning ordinances. see Sandy
City, 827 P.2d at 218; accord Cottonwood Heights
Citizens Ass'n v. Board of Comm'rs, 593 P.2d 138, 140
(Utah 1979); cf. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 586 (Utah 1991) ("The dispositive
factor [in determining whether to defer to an agency's
interpretation of a statute] is whether the agency, by
virtue of its experience or expertise, is in a better
position than the courts to give effect to the
regulatory objective to be achieved.")
Furthermore, the majority's activist approach exceeds
the limited review mandated by the Utah Supreme Court
in Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity v. Salt Lake City, 116
Utah 536, 212 P.2d 177 (1949):
There are, of course, various solutions for
zoning problems such as this; and opinions
8

rn.ay differ as to which is the most
efficacious. But it is not for the court to
weigh the respective merits of these
solutions. That is the duty which lies upon
the shoulders of the governing body . . . If
changes have developed which indicate [the
need for a different approach], that is a
matter for submission to the commission; and
not r/Lie r . * •" h-: • *:>urt" s .
Id. 212 P.2d a L 181. See also Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co. , 272 U.S. U"5, 393, -\r? S.Ct . 1 Z-\ . "2'; 'r. L.Ed. 30?
(1926; ( "We hav- nothing to do with the question of -hwisdom or good policy of municipal ordinances.")
:—, .;-.i::.,:: ^ ^ , l > ,,g'ui ,, :

TOWn Of Alt .t
App.

1992-

' Bench, dissenting

Patterson, trie '"out
Bench's -<f • ~-• f * ' *
to the .. m-i i-

7

. .;

hree years L^rre:,

- Appeals clenr1. ^ • r i : • r -j ?
...

;

:.-. , ..-.

*7^u

:
<ye

t, \;J^ s u t c o: J"ah as

t judicial review of a I- raliry's

of its own zoning ordinance,

fT1

893 P.?,d >V' £0fi.

interpretation
Consequently,

11

rtubstarilid.1deference, " not "de novo" review is the current

state of the law, 4

4

In the majority opinion of Ben Hame Corp., Judge Jackson
cites to a non-board of adjustment case, Burley Lagoon Imp. Ass'n
v. Pierce Co., 686 P.2d 503, 505 (Wash. App. 1984), for the
proposition that: courts review ordinances as questions of law.
However, recognizing the dilemma posed by Judge Bench's dissent,
Judge Jackson quickly asserts that the appellant has noted,
"there has been no official interpretation by Salt Lake County
which would bind or influence the court's interpretation of the
county ordinances." 836 P.2d at 800. Certainly the majority
opinion implies that had there been such an official
interpretation, the case may have been decided differently.
This
is only logical since the statutory standard of review, which
does not allow for "de novo" review, would have been invoked.
9

On the other hand, the logical result of Red Barn's reading
of "illegality" and "de novo" review would be to eviscerate the
"arbitrary and capricious" portion of the statutory land use
standard; thus throwing localities into a tailspin by changing
decades of Utah land use law precedents which provide for
substantial deference to local land use decisions, to include
local interpretations of their own ordinances, and limited
judicial review.
Consider the possibility:

All land use decisions by

localities and their boards of adjustment involve, to some
extent, the interpretation and application of their respective
development codes to the facts and circumstances of a particular
case.

Consequently, under Red Barn's reasoning, any losing party

in every land use case, to include cases involving conditional
use permits and subdivision plat approvals, can claim the action
of the board or commission to be illegal and demand "de novo"
judicial review.

Red Barn's interpretation of "illegality" would

functionally swallow all of the other standards of review and
disrupt the intent of the legislature to allow for limited
judicial review in land use cases.5

5

The County is aware of the recent case of Brown, et. al.
v. Sandy City Board of Adjustment, et. al., Case No. 970156-CA
(decided March 26, 1998). In that case, a three member panel of
the Utah Court of Appeals determined that no deference is due a
board of adjustment's interpretation of its own ordinance. Brown
at note 5. To substantiate its position the Brown court cited to
10

The Patterson case is instruct '"»-',

893 P .2d ot «i0...:„

Ii i

that, case, the Utah County Board of Adjustment approved a special
exception for an airport and Larry Patterson, a competitor who
o w n e d a n o t. h e r p r i v a t" (:;i < :i i i j.) o i: I n f P
decision of the board.

Ixi. -it; t»iH,

W III I

I -.. ;> : n v\i ,.-i y , a p p e a i e d t h e

The court considered two of

Mr, Patterson's allegations.
Firs

dL r.-^ i ^c,

.

•: . jt„-. •_- c A : .c t ne a. L^e

development njjt standard toi crcmotinu roc:ic heaitn, safety,
and welfare wao mr-t
specie * -\* - ^ -

- +~he jpr ; ioariL wne
r^ L-Lsoii assert-a tiioti t:>e board's

interpretation ar.c application :f this -'ode standard \*ov wron 4.
However, the court did not describe 1 111

I.I^LH. J,S

HH-

JVMJ

i.he

Patterson and Ben Hame Corp, , As ha^ UJ.ready been discussed and
will be further discussed herein, neither Patterson, nor Ben Hame
Corp, stand for the proposition cited by the Brown court. The
clear indication in Patterson is that the opinion of Judge Bench
in Ben Hame Corp.; namely, that deference is given to a
locality's interpretation of its own ordinance, is the
controlling Utah law. 893 P.2d at 608. Additionally, as noted
in footnote 4 herein, even Judge Jackson attempted to distinguish
between interpretations of local zoning ordinances by judge's and
local officials in Ben Hame Corp.. For Brown to assert that the
law has inexplicably changed, would effectively overrule
Patterson, the which certainly was nc' •"* mtemplated in Brown.
Furthermore, the Brown case, :.u itself; is distinguished fron 1 t- hipresent case on its facts. In Brown, the issue was over the
interpretation of a substantive requirement of the development
code, while here it is over the interpretation of a procedural
requirement, the necessity of site plan review. As noted herein,
a disagreement over procedure is not an "illegality" giving rise
to "de novo" type review within the meaning of the state statute.

possible illegality of board action in its interpretation of the
development code, but rather it was an issue over the
11

[a] rbitrariness of the [b]oard's [f]inding.n

Id. at 605.

The

Patterson court spent the next three pages of its opinion
discussing the meaning of the code standard to determine whether
the board's interpretation and application was arbitrary.
Ultimately, however, the Patterson court concluded that it should
give substantial discretion to the board's interpretation and
application of its development code standard because "the Board
is in a much better position than we are to achieve the desired
goal of proper zoning as determined by the county commission."
Id, at 607-08.

The court went on to find that there was

substantial evidence in the record supporting the board's
determination that the code requirement was satisfied.

Id. at

608-09.
The County would suggest that the circumstances presently
before this Court are akin to this Patterson allegation wherein
the interpretation and application of a development code
provision was ultimately left to the discretion of the board as
long as there was substantial evidence supporting the decision in
the administrative record.

This reading of Patterson is

consistent with U.C.A. 17-27-708(6) and Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d
at 807 (J. Bench, dissenting), which was expressly adopted in
Patterson, 893 P.2d at 608.

As noted in the Brief of the
12
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f

of as

an illegal action.

The only illegality that could be alleged is

if the County's Director or Board did not have the proper
authority to render decisions on the issuance of building
permits.

However, it is undisputed by both state statute and

local ordinance that they have that authority.

See U.C.A. 17-27-

704 & 1002; Code, Sections 1.9 (e) (2) [a] [1] & 4.2(e)(1).
In sum, to suggest that an illegality exists whenever a
party disagrees with the interpretation of the zoning regulations
by the board of adjustment would swallow the limited judicial
review contemplated by the legislature and, under Red Barn's
reasoning, allow for "de novo" review in all land use cases, thus
blurring the line between the branches of government by
functionally transforming trial courts into zoning commissions or
super zoning boards.

See generally, McQuillin, Municipal

Corporations 3rd ed., Vol. 8A, Section 25.278 (1994).6
II.

A FINAL SITE PLAN IS NOT LIMITED TO CONDITIONAL USES.
Red Barn suggests that the County is treating its project

like a "conditional use" and asserts that only "conditional
uses," not "permitted uses," have a final site plan requirement.
(Appellee's Brief, pp. 12). Red Barn dwells on Sections 3.6 and

6

As to Red Barn's references to Sandy City v. Salt Lake
County, 827 P.2d 212 (Utah 1992), Ben Hame Corp., and Beaver
County v. Utah State Tax Commission, 916 P.2d 344 (Utah 1996),
the County relies upon its argument in its appellate brief.
(Brief of the Appellant Summit County, pp. 24-27) .
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dwellings provided that ••* • .ina". site plan has
been approved by the County and construction
plans have been released by t^-- bounty
Engineer
emphasis added) ..

It has been Red Barn who has consistently attempted to
interject ambiguity into the Code by picking and choosing which
Code sections to recite and which to ignore.

The law is clear,

the Code must be read as a whole in order to give meaning and
effect to all of its provisions.

Patterson, 893 P.2d at 606.

It

is the County's interpretation of the Code, not that of Red Barn,
which accomplishes the purposes of Patterson.

(See Appellant

Summit County's Reply Brief [hereinafter, "Reply Brief'1], at 2-7
(Response to Appellee's Summary of the Arguments); Brief of the
Appellant Summit County, pp. 38-41).
IV.

CHAPTER 4 IS APPLICABLE TO PERMITTED USES.
There is no evidence that Chapter 4 does not apply to

permitted uses.

Red Barn's argument to that effect is a

ridiculous one.

(Appellee's Brief, pp. 14-15).

Section

3.6(a)(1) states that a "permitted use" must obtain a
"development permit."

Chapter 4 is the part of the Code which

governs development permits.

Consequently, it is clear that

Chapter 4 will always apply to permitted uses.
It is no secret why Red Barn does not want Chapter 4 to
apply to its use, Section 4.12(b) requires a final site plan
prior to issuance of a building permit.

As has been referenced

previously, the County's interpretation of Section 4.12(b) takes
into account. Section 12.2.1 of the Guidelines.

(Reply Brief,

supra. at 3-5). Red Barn, however, purposefully ignores this
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Red Barn's allegations of arbitrary application
* ~;
v.;oae to single family units as "lots of record" was n- r
substantiated before the trial court. The County's position on
such vested single family lots has been a consistent one in which
it requires the applicant to obtain a minor permit. Code,
Sections 2.2(65) & 2.2(69); Guidelines, Section 12.2.1 & Chapter
15. See also R. at 309-10 (Memorandum of Director Dotson).
Contrary to Red Barn's assertions, Section 2.2(69.6) states that
a minor permit applies to " [a]11 single lot or single unit
residential uses on existing parcels that would otherwise be
rendered unbuildable pursuant to the density restrictions of
Section 5.13 herein."
In other words, minor permits apply to
single family units that are "lots of record" under the Code. In
point of fact, given the County's interpretation of Section
4.12(b), the Director has applied the Code very consistently.
Red Barn's attempt to interject an irrelevant issue into its
argument is simply an attempt to deflect attention away from the
appellate issue -- ^ " i ^ - - ^ -•. i.te plan required for the Red Bairn
project?
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Application to conditional uses.

Red Barn fails to

explain why, if its illogical for permitted uses to be subject to
both plats and site plans, it's not equally illogical to require
such for conditional uses?

Additionally, how can Red Barn

assert that it is a correct reading of Section 4.12(b) to require
site plan and plat approval of conditional uses when Section 3.7
of the Code, which discusses the requirements for a conditional
use permit, mandates only a site plan and not a plat?

Lastly,

Section 4.12(b) references numerous other permits which have no
relation at all to conditional uses; such as a "master
preliminary plat," "specific plan," and "development agreement."
That, in itself, makes Red Barn's position that Section 4.12(b)
applies only to conditional uses inconsistent with the specific
language of that section.
In sum, the County admits that the literal language of
Section 4.12(b) would require all development activities to
submit to both a final site plan and plat process.

However, Red

Barn's insistence that this should not be construed to apply to
permitted uses is contrary to the rules of statutory
construction.

Furthermore, Red Barn's interpretation that it is

more logical to read Section 4.12(b) as only applying to
conditional uses is inconsistent with Section 3.7 and the plain
language of Section 4.12(b).

The more logical reading is that

espoused by the County, who uses Section 12.2.1 of the
18
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Section 2 of the Guidelines clearly states that it is V u
assist County staff and applicants in the administration and
implementation of the Code."
ly

and 6.14(a) (1) clearly require a final site plan for Red Barn's
project as a prerequisite for a building permit, and Section
5.17(a) would clearly require compliance with that site plan as a
part of the building permit process.
Perhaps the confusion in Red Barn's position is in its
failure to understand the purpose of Chapter 5 of the Code, and
thus Section 5.17.

As Section 5.1 explains

Establishment of Development Standards.
(a) Purpose. The purpose of these
development standards is to protect the
general health, safety and welfare of the
citizens of Summit County, and to implement
the Snyderville Basin General Plan by
controlling the type, location, density,
intensity, and other characteristics of
development within the Snyderville Basin
Zoning District.
(b) All development orders and development
permits shall comply with the provisions of
this Chapter, the standards contained herein
and the policies of the Snyderville Basin
General Plan. Such compliance shall be a
condition precedent to the issuance of a
development order or approval of a
development permit.
(emphasis added).
So Chapter 5 contains the "development standards" which are
implemented in "development permits."

As has already been

discussed, Chapter 4 regulates development permits.

Final site

plans, as well as building permits, by definition, are
development permits.

Code, Section 2.2(43).

Section 5.17 is

then merely a series of specific development standards for
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building permits, which are in addition to all of the other
general development standards in Chapter 5 that apply alike to
all development permits.
VI.

SECTION 6.14 APPLIES TO RED BARN.
Red Barn desires to distinguish Section 6.14(a)(1) because

it specifically and unequivocally requires Red Barn to have final
site plan approval.

(Appellee's Brief, pp. 16-17).

Chapter 6 of the Code discusses "public improvements."
Section 6.14 deals with the issuance of building permits and
certificates of occupancy, and attempts to ensure that all public
improvements that are on a final subdivision plat or a final site
plan are completed.

Section 6.14(a)(1) specifically references

how those improvements will be satisfied in the case of nonresidential and multi-family uses, which are the exact type of
use which Red Barn proposes in its Timberwolf Lodge project.
The applicability of Section 6.14 to Red Barn was discussed
at the June 19, 1997 hearing of the Board,
Chair DeGray asked about Section 6.14, and
Mr. Poole felt that did not apply because a
public improvement required by the plat or
site plan was not involved. Planner Deis
explained that, for an applicant to get from
the road to his property, the right-of-way
must be crossed, requiring an encroachment
permit, which would be a public improvement.
(R. at 321). Based upon the factual evidence before it, the
Board ultimately determined that Section 6.14(a) (1) did apply.
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(R. at 316). Red Barn is merely attempting to find a loophole in
order to ignore the express language of Section 6.14(a)(1).
However, no loophole exists.
VII. THE GUIDELINES ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE COUNTY'S
POSITION,
As has been previously explained in this Reply Brief, the
Guidelines are consistent with the County's interpretation of
Section 4.12(b).

In fact, as discussed, the County has read

Section 12.2.1 in Red Barn's favor, interpreting it to mean that
only a site plan is required, not both a site plan and plat.
The distortion here is not in the County's reading of the
Guidelines, as Red Barn asserts, but it is in Red Barn's attempt
to read into the Guidelines that which is not there.

Red Barn

reads "Building permit, use by right" in Section 4.4.3 of the
Guidelines as referring to "permitted uses."

(Appellee's Brief,

pp. 18). For Red Barn's interpretation to be correct, a
permitted use would need to be a property right.

However, as is

well established in the State of Utah, "an owner of property
holds it subject to zoning ordinances enacted pursuant to a
state's police power."

Patterson, 893 P.2d at 607.

As such, "a

landowner has no vested right in existing or anticipated zoning."
Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388, 392
(Utah 1980) (quoting Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South
Coast Regional Comm'n, 553 P.2d 546, 553 (Cal. 1976)).
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Hence,

the "use by right" referred to in the Guidelines cannot possibly
be a reference to a "permitted use," rather it is a reference to
a "vested right."

A "permitted use" is zoning (Section 3.5),

which is not, by definition of the Utah Supreme Court, vested
under law.

If this were not the case, once any permitted use in

a zoning district were established, it could never be changed
because the owner would have acquired a right in its continued
existence.

Such a result would functionally end zoning in the

State of Utah.

As can be seen, Red Barn's interpretation of

Section 4.4.3 is simply not plausible.
VIII.

RED BARN'S INTERPRETATION IS CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY.
Of utmost importance to the disagreement over whether a

final site plan is or is not required of the Red Barn project is
the public process and how the impacts of this project on the
community are addressed.
The purpose of zoning and permitting regulations is to allow
impacts on the community to be taken into consideration by local
government, and to the extent reasonable, require the developer
to provide for some type of mitigation of those impacts.

Summit

County's permitting system in the Snyderville Basin is structured
in such a way as to accomplish this by providing for two
important influences on the planning process:
and (2) a planning commission recommendation.
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(1) public input,

The purpose of public input into a large project, such as
Red Barn's, is easy to understand.

Generally speaking, the

County planning staff depend upon the neighbors and other
interested parties to bring information on impacts to the
forefront in a public forum.

This is information which the staff

may have no other way of knowing about.
The purpose of planning commission involvement is just as
essential to the public process.

The planning commission is the

County Commission's duly appointed planning experts from the
community at large.

The County depends upon the advice of these

individuals to ensure that the impacts of the project are
reasonably mitigated.
The mechanism which the County Commission has elected to
provide for public input and planning commission involvement is
through site plans and plats.

Code Sections 4.6, 4.7, & 4.12(b);

Guidelines Chapter 7.
In essence, what Red Barn has attempted to accomplish is to
thwart the public process and avoid the presentation of its
project to the community in a public forum.

The County

Commission implemented a permitting system for a purpose.

Red

Barn's reading of the Code is contrary to that purpose.
Consequently, Red Barn's position, in the opinion of the County,
is simply contrary to public policy.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court failed to follow the statutory standard of
review, which grants deference to the decision of the Summit
County Board of Adjustment.

To compound the error, the trial

court failed to properly apply the rules of statutory
construction, which show that the Snyderville Basin Development
Code requires a final site plan for the Red Barn Timberwolf Lodge
project prior to issuance of a building permit.
Under the appropriate standard of review, this Court should
conclude that the Summit County Board of Adjustment's
interpretation of the Snyderville Basin Development Code, with
regard to the Red Barn Timberwolf Lodge project, is reasonable,
reverse the decision of the trial court granting Red Barn summary
judgment, and instead, grant judgment in favor of Summit County.
DATED this

day of April, 1998.

Davicl L. Tnomas
Deputy Summit County Attorney
Attorney for Appellant
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